Abstract What motivates the United States when it casts votes in international organizations? Answers to this question have long suffered from the opaque manner by which many international organizations operate and the recalcitrance of U.S. officials to publicly disclose U.S. voting behavior. In this paper, we test several hypotheses explaining how the United States takes a position on loan decisions in the multilateral development banks (MDBs). Our quantitative study uses U.S. Treasury data for U.S. positions on loan decisions from
Scholars examining the voting behavior of states within international organizations have largely concentrated on voting in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council. During the Cold War there were efforts to identify voting blocs in the UN.
Other works assessed whether or not United States (U.S.) foreign aid was effective in earning support for American policies in the UN.
1 Since the end of the Cold War more attention has been made to the linkage of UN voting to multilateral and bilateral aid flows. 2 For example, studies have demonstrated that elected members on the UN Security Council on average receive more assistance from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as more American bilateral aid. 3 While there has been recent attention to the relationship between Japan's bilateral aid and voting in the International Whaling Commission, 4 scholarly attention remains fixed on the UN system despite the hundreds of other international organizations from which to choose. Obviously the attention to the UN system largely reflects the almost axiomatic treatment of the UN as the most important international organization. A less obvious reason for the focus on the UN system is the frustrating fact many salient international organizations do not disclose votes taken by their members. Further complicating efforts to obtain voting records, some international organizations, such as the IMF, claim to determine the outcome of decisions by the "sense of the meeting" rather than a formal, and recorded, vote. Research identifying levels of American influence in the IMF has relied on indirect measures instead. 5 1 See Wittkopf 1973; Rai 1980; Kegley and Hook 1991; and Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2008 . 2 Wang 1999. 3 See Dreher and Sturm 2006; Kuziemko and Werker 2006; and Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland 2009 . 4 Miller and Dolšak 2007; and Strand and Tuman 2012. 5 See Momani 2004; and Stone 2004, 2008. The contribution of this research is to explain voting patterns, or formal influence, of a key member of many MDBs, the U.S. in the time period [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] . While the U.S. has supported the vast majority of proposed projects in MDBs, its support has not been universal and there are some countries whose projects seem to face more scrutiny than others. Our primary research question, therefore, is what are the determinants of official U.S. support for proposed projects in the MDBs? In addition, we evaluate the degree to which the U.S. has formal influence over outcomes of the decision-making MDB process by identifying the frequency with which final decisions by MDB bodies align with the official U.S. vote. This allows us to address the question of whether formal U.S. influence through the vote of its Executive Directors in MDBs does influence outcomes. Our research also expands the literature on influence in MDBs by including the entire population of organizations affected by the recent U.S. transparency requirement, extending our analysis beyond the World Bank to include regional development banks as well. The Multilateral Development Banks (MBDs) do not regularly publish voting tabulations making it difficult to systematically evaluate the voting behavior of member states. As a result, scholars have focused on identifying mechanisms of informal influence in MDBs. Many have found evidence of American influence outside the formal vote. 6 However, to our knowledge there has not been a study on the formal influence of the U.S. using newly available data on U.S. See Fleck and Kilby 2006; and Kilby 2009 and Kilby , 2011 and Kilby , and 2013 Leech and Leech 2005. 8 Broz 2008; Babb 2009; and Lavelle 2011. 9 Sanford 1982; and Schoultz 1982. We begin with an initial examination of American influence in MDBs, highlighting changes in U.S. legislation that increase transparency of formal U.S. positions and previous research on informal and formal influence in the World Bank and regional development banks. This is followed by a review of U.S. motivations for its positions on multilateral aid projects, including
Congressional restraints on U.S. positions based on the recipient country of a proposed project or restrictions regarding substantive issue areas. Then the new dataset on U.S. votes for MDB projects is presented using descriptive statistics. An overview of the data and method used along with results of our statistical models precedes the conclusion suggesting directions for future research.
American Influence In The Multilateral Development Banks
What motivates the votes cast by the United States in the MDBs? Answers to this question have long suffered from the opaque manner by which the MDBs operate and the recalcitrance of U.S.
Treasury officials to disclose, in public, U.S. voting behavior. Most studies of voting in the MDBs suffer from a lack of public disclosure of how members vote on particular loans and policy issues. Since votes on loans in these international organizations are sub rosa, many observers have argued there is an accountability problem. The lack of public disclosure of the positions of members (and how they cast their votes) "means the reasoning for a decision is not open to scrutiny by other states, nor is the position taken by each member".
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This lack of transparency has been a source of criticism by members of the U.S. Congress. 17 Voting weights, of course, do not necessarily denote the ability to affect outcomes (i.e., voting power) because of the nature of weighted voting systems. Voting power is a function of not only loans and other matters. In the AsDB the U.S. usually has held as many votes as Japan, although in 2013 Australia became the second largest donor, surpassing the U.S. 18 In the IDB the United
States has always held at least 30 percent of all votes, a position allowing it to block certain decisions requiring special majorities over 70 percent.
American Formal And Informal Influence In The Approval Of Projects
To what extent is American support for a project needed for it to be approved by one of the MDBs? While a lot of prior work on American influence in IOs has tending to view the U.S. as essential for project approval, especially during times of crisis, a review of MDB projects that the United States did not support with an abstention or 'no' vote reveals that in most of the lending windows we have data for, these items are regularly approved. Through a search of project databases, we determined whether an item lacking formal American support was or was not ultimately approved. The ratio of loans approved without U.S. support varies across banks and lending windows, however it is clear from our data below that formal support by the U.S.
does not guarantee the eventual outcome of a particular project.
We note, however, that as it has demonstrated in the case of the IMF, American influence casts a long shadow over the operations of international organizations and this influence is difficult to directly measure. 19 Access to information and multiple avenues of influence provides the United States with the ability to shape the policies and activities of the MDBs. The institutional designs of the regional development banks may attenuate the informal power of the United States as other, regional members may have more informal and at times formal power of the votes held by a member but also is a function of the decision-rule being applied; see Leech and Leech 2005. 18 Jemima Garrett, "Australia becomes second biggest aid donor to Asian Development Bank", Australia Network News 20, August 2013. 19 project and policy lending is vital. 21 In reviewing approval of projects not supported by the U.S., however, we find American support is not essential for passage of proposals. Our data are outcomes of prior negotiations and the exercise of informal power by the United States (and other members). were approved in four of the eight years included our dataset. The lowest approval rate is in 20 Luck 1999; and McKeown 2009 . 21 Babb 2009, 39-45. 22 We are missing project documents, but are working on obtaining the necessary information to calculate results for the African Development Bank.
MIGA with 2.78 percent, although MIGA accounted for only about 3.5 percent of all unsupported World Bank projects in our dataset.
Among the regional development banks, items not supported by the U.S. were approved nearly 90 percent of the time in the IDB. As in the IBRD, for half the years in our sample 100 percent of unsupported IDB items were approved. This result suggests the United States may be less influential over projects in the IDB than the conventional wisdom holds. In the AsDB and EBRD, items the U.S. fails to support are approved 52 and 42 percent of the time, respectively.
[ Table 1 about here]
We can conclude that American formal support for a project is not essential for the project's approval. Moreover, we can conclude that in the World Bank and IDB even when the U.S.
withholds support for projects they are more often than not approved. In sum, the absence of formal American support does not seem to predict the failure of projects across nine key multilateral lending windows. This supports the dual notion that formal American influence in
MDBs through the vote of its Executive Directors is not as critical as previously thought and in some cases, its informal influence may be relatively more robust. 23 The potential selection bias in that these data are for projects presented for a formal vote while all projects, including those abandoned prior to this stage, are subject to informal influence by major stakeholders in previous stages of the loan process further supports this claim. [ Tables 2 and 3 is the ratio of loans receiving U.S. support. Our variable is similar to the measure of voting affinity used in other studies. 29 This measure ranges from a value of 0 to 1.0 with "1" reflecting 100 percent U.S. approval for all loans that year. One advantage from using this ratio measure is it results in observations that are country-year, aligning with the format of available data for several key independent variables. Furthermore, if we used raw data on votes or project our units would be items considered in the MDBs. The disadvantage of this is for some countries there may be over 100 items per year while for others there may be only 1, or zero. However, by using our ratio measure we avoid the statistical pitfalls of having so much within-panel variation.
Moreover, we seek to explain U.S. support for countries over time, not U.S. support for particular projects. Explanatory variables included in our models are also likely to apply to an entire set of a country's projects, rather than a specific item. Factors that are likely to influence
U.S. loan support ratio are identified along the following three dimensions: economic, political,
and country-specific characteristics.
Economic Variables
Per capita national product (GDP/capita) is used to assess whether U.S. support for projects is driven by recipient need, testing our first hypothesis. It is expected that the U.S. is more likely to vote in favor of loans to countries that have lower per capita GDP, reflecting a greater level of need for development assistance for a given country. Domestic influence, whether through a As the largest market in the world system, the U.S. is more likely to support loans for countries for where there is an existing economic relationship defined by high levels of trade in goods and services and/or a formal trade agreement(s). In addition, the U.S has an interest in expanding developing country market access for its own multinational corporations (MNCs), reflected by the historical dominance of neoliberal conditions attached to multilateral development assistance. Bilateral trade between the U.S. and potential loan recipients is used as one proxy for U.S. economic interests testing our second key hypothesis. We sum bilateral exports in goods to the U.S. based on value (country exports to U.S.) U.S.. Furthermore, the variable for affinity of votes in the UN, using the three-category index (where 1= yes or approval, 2 = abstain, and 3 = no or disapproval), 38 
Country-Specific Characteristics
Characteristics of the recipient country included in our study are levels of human rights, democracy, and corruption. Our measure of human rights is the political terror scale constructed from reports from Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department. 40 This scale ranges from 1-5 with 1 representing "countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for 38 Strezhnev and Voeten 2013-02. 39 Milner and Tingley 2012 40 Gibney, Cornett, and Wood 2013.
their view, and torture is rare or exceptional" to 5 where "terror has expanded to the whole population".
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Level of democracy is measured by the polity2 variable from the Polity IV Project. 42 Polity2 ranges from -10 to +10, with -10 reflecting the most autocratic, or least democratic, and +10 most democratic, and a 0 value for neither democratic nor autocratic. In addition, polity2
replaces values of -66, -77, and -88 for failed states and other special cases with values that fall within the -10 to +10 scale to facilitate time series analysis. Democracy (0 to +10) and autocracy A measure of corruption is also included as it is captures individual and business interactions with the public sector, an additional measure of political and economic institutions in the recipient country. The source for this variable is Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, based on a 0-100 scale with a value of 0 for a country being perceived as 'highly corrupt' and 100 for being perceived as 'being very clean'. 43 Corruption is not highly correlated with the Political Terror Scale or Polity IV, measuring a different dimension of political institutions and economic institutions. 41 Ibid. 42 Marshall and Cole 2011. 43 Transparency International 2013.
Methods And Results
Using Prais-Winsten estimation of our cross sectional time series data, statistical analyses were run for several models including categories of economic, political, and country characteristic variables. The first model includes the following core economic, political, and country-specific variables: GDP/capita, bilateral trade relations, political terror, U.S. bilateral economic aid, U.S.
bilateral military aid, executive political party, UN voting affinity, and a China dummy variable.
Our second model augments these variables with support for the U.S./NATO operation in Afghanistan, support for the U.S. operation in Iraq, level of democracy (polity2), and corruption.
Early trials indicated the possibility of unit effects and suggested we needed to control for China in particular. Therefore we include a dummy variable for observations for China in the timeseries estimations of our models. In addition, we employed random and fixed-effects panel estimations of our models to control for the possibility of systemic unit effects.
We employed a Fisher-type unit-root test to test for stationarity, a suitable option for an unbalanced panel. 44 The Fisher test applies an augmented Dickey-Fuller to each panel, assuming an AR(1) process. We rejected the null hypothesis of unit roots for all but the variables UN voting affinity, GDP/capita, and polity2, leading to a more cautionary interpretation for these results. Table 4 provides results for two models using the full dataset with Model 1 representing our basic model.
[ Table 4 about here]
In Model 1, countries with a higher (i.e. worse) political terror scale score were less likely to receiving American support. We also find some evidence the U.S. rewards countries that vote 44 See Maddala and Wu 1999; and Choi 2001. with it in the UN General Assembly as well as countries with more bilateral trade. The greater the recipient need, as captured by GDP/capita, the more likely the U.S. is to support its items.
We find no indication that U.S. bilateral economic or military aid is a predictor of support for MDB projects with early trials suggesting that military and economic aid as a total combined figure also failed to predict U.S. support. It may be that the United States rewards its partners in ways not captured by bilateral economic and military aid or additional control variables included in the second model. The dummy variable for China is significant with a negative sign in all trials, suggesting the U.S. looks less favorably on MDB programs involving the PRC. While U.S.
executive party affiliation was weakly significant in the time series estimation, this result was not supported by panel estimations or additional robust checks. Robust standard error and randomeffect panel estimations supported all other significant results for this model.
While the strong economic but tenuous political relationship between the U.S. and China justifies treating China as an outlier, there are additional reasons to address the possibility of overall unit effects in our models as we treating the country as the primary unit, rather than individual lending projects. It should be noted that data for the explanatory and control variables included in our dataset are available on an annual, sometimes quarterly, basis thereby limiting our ability to organize data using projects as a unit, rather than the traditional selection of country-year. A Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test on a random effects model for both specifications confirms there are significant differences across countries in our dataset. To address this, we ran fixed effects linear estimations of this model, excluding the dummy variable for China. Using a fixed effects model with robust standard errors to control for observed heteroskedasticity we failed to find statistical significance for any of our independent variables in Model 1, however GDP/capita was significant in a linear fixed-effect estimation. A lack of sufficient variance for countries across the 2004-2011 time period may explain these results, as many of the country characteristics in the dataset do not change over time. Furthermore, as many of the explanatory variables vary across unit but not within units, it is not as robust a predictor of the ratio of U.S. support for projects as the random effects model that confirmed results reported in Table 4 .
To provide an additional robust check we ran the same estimations using a weakly balanced dataset of 122 countries in the same time period to address our strongly unbalanced full dataset panel. Those results are also reported in Table 4 Emirates. The effect of U.S. executive party affiliation at the time of the vote was no longer significant and the effects of UN voting affinity and political terror remained significant at the lowest threshold (p<0.10). In the fixed-effects linear estimation of Model 1, political terror was found to be significant in addition to GDP/capita.
In Model 2, results for China, GDP/capita, and bilateral trade remain consistent, while UN voting and political terror are no longer significant. Interestingly, we continue to fail to find a relationship between U.S. bilateral economic and military assistance and our dependent variable.
There is also no indication that the U.S. systematically favors items for its coalition partners in 
Conclusion
This paper has examined the determinants for American support of items at the final stage of approval in major MDBs. We considered a variety of explanatory variables in order to test several hypotheses regarding the motivation for U.S. official support for proposed projects. We find strong support for our first hypothesis; namely, that the U.S. is more likely to support items for countries with lower the GDP/capita. We also find consistent support for our second hypothesis regarding bilateral trade relations. There is no support for H3 and H4 that the U.S.
rewarded its coalition partners in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, there is weak support for U.S. rewarding countries for voting similarly in the UN and country-specific factors such as regime type, level of corruption, and commitment to human rights.
Our results point to a need for further work to more fully explain the determinants of U.S.
support for MDB projects and to account for nuances in our dataset. It may be that given the variation in institutional contexts there are important differences across MDBs that we are not tapping since we are pooling items. In short, cross-institutional models need to be further explored using our existing dataset. We also need to consider accounting for global economic conditions given the effects of the Great Recession and the response by most MDBs to support increases in liquidity. In sum, now that researchers have access to data about U.S. support for MDB projects, a closer examination of the determinants of American support (and opposition) is in order. 
